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GREENMOSS BUILDERS, INC. v. DUN &
BRADSTREET INC. INVITES
CONTROVERSY
ELMER GERTZ*

In little more than two decades, the United States Supreme
Court has handed down several landmark decisions that define and
refine the constitutional guidelines in the troublesome area of defamation.' It appeared that there was little more for the Court to decide except for certain largely peripheral aspects. Then, on June 26,
1985, the Court decided, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Vermont, the case of Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.2 The judgment in favor of Greenmoss was affirmed, but there
was no majority opinion. Justice Powell, who eleven years earlier
had written the opinion of the Court in the important decision of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,- announced the judgment of the Court
in the Greenmoss case and delivered an opinion, in which only Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. Other opinions in the case
were delivered by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White concurring only in the judgment, and by Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined, dissenting. State
courts generally assumed that, just as public officials and public
figures had to prove actual malice in the New York Times v. Sullivan 4 sense, private persons involved in matters of public interest
had, also, to prove such actual malice in order to prevail in a defamation action. Then came Gertz8 and the courts were disabused in
their interpretation of Rosenbloom.' Even the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had shared the common error
when it affirmed the dismissal of Gertz in the first trial.7 It was only
* Ph.B., University of Chicago, J.D. University of Chicago.
1. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
3. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4. 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964) (a statement made with "actual malice" is one made
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not").
5. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
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after the Supreme Court decided otherwise and there was a retrial
resulting in a resounding Gertz victory that the Court of Appeals
upheld the new view with respect to private persons involved as
plaintiffs in defamation actions.8 There followed case after case in
which the highest Court of the land reaffirmed the position it had
taken in Gertz.9
Thus, one must be very careful in reaching conclusions as to the
effect of plurality opinions. This is especially true in considering
Greenmoss. It is necessary as in all reviewing court cases, to ascertain the precise situation that gave rise to the judgment and the
differing opinions.
We start with the unanimous opinion of the Vermont Supreme
Court in Greenmoss,10 where the case was first reviewed. This court
handed down its decision on April 15, 1983, a bit more than two
years prior to the United States Court judgment. As the Vermont
court recited, Greenmoss, a building contractor, brought a defamation action against Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, as a
result of an erroneous credit report issued to the contractor's creditors. 1 The trial court entered judgment in favor of Greenmoss for
$50,000 in compensatory or actual damages and $300,000 for punitive damages, 2 but granted the motion. of Dun & Bradstreet for a
new trial because the court thought its instructions to the jury were
erroneous.' 8 Thereupon several questions of law were certified by
the trial court to the state supreme court, which held: (1) as a matter of federal constitutional law, qualified protections afforded media in "private" defamation actions, pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments, do not extend to defamation actions involving
nonmedia defendants;"' (2) there is no qualified common-law privilege for credit reporting agencies, such as Dun & Bradstreet, in defamation actions;' (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict as to the
issue of punitive damages;' 6 and (4) any error by the trial court in
instructing in the standards of liability under the United States Supreme Court affording qualified protections to media in "private"
defamation action was harmless error.' 7 Therefore, the trial court's
8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982).
9. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
10. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d
414 (1983).
11. Id. at 67, 461 A.2d at 415.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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original jury verdict for Greenmoss was affirmed and the order for a
8
new trial set aside.1

The Vermont Supreme Court stressed that Dun & Bradstreet
operated a business in which factual and financial reports about individual business enterprises are issued exclusively to subscribers of
its service."' These reports are based, purportedly, on information
elicited from the individual business itself, the business' banking
and credit sources, trade suppliers, and public records.2 0 When
Greenmoss' president met with its principal creditor, a bank, to discuss the possibility of future financing, it was informed by the bank
that it had just received a credit report issued by Dun & Bradstreet
that Greenmoss had recently filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.2 This was totally false, as Greenmoss had never suffered a
major economic reversal and its financial condition was sound.2 ' As

a result the bank put off any consideration of credit to Greenmoss
and then terminated its credit, allegedly for reasons other than the
8
unfavorable report.2
Greenmoss demanded that Dun & Bradstreet immediately correct the report and tender a list of those creditors who had received
the false report in order that it might reassure them.'4 Dun & Brad2
street refused to give Greenmoss such list.

On the basic issue as to whether the Gertz rule would apply
both to media and nonmedia defendants in defamation cases the
Vermont Supreme Court had much to say.'
In fact, one is tempted to quote at too great a length what the
court had to say. It pointed out that the issue of whether Gertz applied to nonmedia defendants had never been decided by the United
States Supreme Court. But the matter had been considered in a
number of state courts.' The court pointed out that the nonmedia
proponents emphasized that they have rights worthy of First
Amendment protection and it is, therefore, illogical to afford them
fewer protections than the media.' 8 The Vermont Supreme Court
declared the distinction between media and nonmedia, illusory and
difficult to draw.'
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 72-73, 461 A.2d at 420-21.
Id. at 88, 461 A.2d at 416.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73, 461 A.2d at 417.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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The court decided, however, that it is not difficult to draw the
distinction between media and nonmedia in cases involving credit
reporting agencies, such as Dun & Bradstreet, which are in the business of selling confidential financial data to a limited number of feepaying subscribers.30 The court, therefore, expressed its agreement
with the majority of circuit courts, and found that credit agencies,
such as Dun & Bradstreet, are not entitled to the same First
Amendment protection as contemplated by New York Times and its
progeny, including Gertz.3 1 The court observed:

[I]n carefully surveying the decisions of those jurisdictions which have
specifically addressed the issue of whether Gertz should be applied to
nonmedia defendants, we note that the majority have refused such an
extension. Although we are not bound by these decisions, their reasoning is both persuasive and compelling. In nonmedia defamation actions, "[tihe crucial elements .. .which brought the United States

Supreme Court into the field of defamation law are missing. There is
no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues: there is no
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning
self-government; and there is no'' threat of liability causing a reaction
of self-censorship by the press. 13
Of course, the losing party, Dun & Bradstreet, petitioned the
United States Court on certiorari.33 The petitioner reduced the issue
presented in the case to whether the First Amendment's limitations
on the award of presumed and punitive damages for libel, recognized in Gertz, apply to "non-media" defendants. 4 It declared that
there could be no recovery for compensatory or "general" damages
against a "non-media" defendant absent a showing of "actual malice" as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan." It reasoned that
the law of libel would become too complex if there had to be a
threshold ruling as to the defendant's status and that, in any event,
it would be too difficult to apply any such distinction. 6
After the original argument before the Court on March 21, 1984,
that Court entered an order on July 5, 1984, that "requested" the
parties to brief and argue the following questions: (1) Whether, in a
defamation action, the constitutional rule of New York Times and
Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages should apply
where the suit is against a non-media defendant, and (2) Whether,
in a defamation action the constitutional rule of New York Times
and Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages should
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 69-70, 461 A.2d at 417-18.
Id. at 70, 461 A.2d at 418.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985).
Id. at 2941.

35. Id. at 2942.
36. Id.
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apply when the speech is of a commercial or economic nature.
Significant amicus curiae briefs were filed. The one that the Information Industry Association filed vigorously argued that the New
York Times and Gertz rule should apply irrespective of the status of
the defendant, and that the fact that the speech involves commercial or economic information does not deprive the speaker of First
Amendment protection against the unrestricted imposition of presumed or punitive damages." The brief pointed out that the Association represents approximately 300 information publishers and information service organizations. Dow Jones & Company, in its
amicus brief in support of Dun & Bradstreet, pointed out that it
publishes the Wall Street Journal and is, also, involved in the dissemination of information through a variety of electronic news. 8 A
somewhat surprising amicus brief was filed by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization in support of
the Dun & Bradstreet position. The AFL-CIO, it declared, is a federation of 95 national and international trade unions with a total
membership of 13,500,000 working people." It opined that if Dun &
Bradstreet is not part of the media, neither is the AFL-CIO or its
affiliated unions .4 Thus the unions will be faced with the increased
danger of defamation actions. On the other hand, the amicus brief
in support of Greenmoss filed by Sunward Corporation advised the
Court that it was involved in litigating similar issues in a case then
ending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
1
Circuit.'
After the grant of certiorari and while the case was still pending
before the United States Supreme Court, the Vermont Law Review
published an extensive analysis of the Vermont Supreme court judgment as if to influence the thinking of the highest court of the
land.42 The article stated:
When the Vermont Supreme Court decided Greenmoss by reference
to the federal defamation law of Gertz, it coincidentally embraced
Justice Stewart's view that the Constitution of the United States differentiates between those within and without the "institutional
37. Information Industry Association amicus curiae brief at 1-2, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
38. Dow Jones & Co. amicus curiae brief at 1-2; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
39. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization amicus curiae brief, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985).
40. Id.
41. Sunward Corp. amicus curiae brief at 1, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985), see Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., No. 83-2644 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1983).
42. Case Comment, Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, 10 VT. L. REv.
205 (1985).
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press," if not for exactly Justice Stewart's reasons. The defense, after
all, had asked the Vermont court to extend to all defamation defendants the protections of Gertz specifically-an extension quite beyond
the power of the court as a matter of federal constitutional law. The
supreme court had no choice but to apply the Gertz rules exactly as it
did, and to find that the first amendment does not protect defamatory
remarks made by individuals about other private parties. No such result, however, is necessary under state law. The competing interests of
reputation and freedom of speech are recognized by the Vermont
Constitution. An adjudication of the rights of the parties in Greenmoss would have been quite possible based exclusively on the relevant
provisions of the state charter. The court could have determined,
under the freedom of speech and freedom of the press language contained in the state constitution, that the privileges afforded to private
speakers and to the institutional press are equal and co-extensive. The
court might just as well have determined that the state document offered a degree of protection identical to that created by its federal
counterpart. 3
In considering Greenmoss, one should bear in mind that the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbids
the making of any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.""' The press is expressly given the broadest protection without any limitation or any language distinguishing between the different products of the press, nor, indeed, of speech generally. Does this
mean that all expression by the press or of speech are equally entitled to constitutional protection since the enactment of the fourteenth amendment? That is the question that was largely avoided as
of the time of New York Times and Gertz. It should be noted, too,
that there is no express reference to the press in the freedom of
speech provision of the Illinois Constitution." That is the difficulty
that we face in interpretation in this State.
We come now to what Justice Powell and his brethren said
about the case in a 5 to 4 decision affirming the judgment of the
Vermont Supreme Court. They spoke not on the media-nonmedia
issue that was issued in the petition for a writ of certiorari and in
the "request" made by the Court itself in connection with the reargument of the case, but on the distinction between matters of public
interest and those purely private.
Just as he had done earlier in Gertz, Justice Powell began his
opinion in Greenmoss with a clear statement of the issue.4" He
observed:
43. Id. at 218-19.
44.
45.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
ILL. CONST. art. I, 4 ("all persons may speak, write and publish freely, being

responsible for the abuse of that liberty").

46. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2941

(1985).
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In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), we held that the
First Amendment restricted the damages that a private individual
could obtain from a publisher for a libel that involved a matter of
public concern. More specifically, we held that in these circumstances
the First Amendment prohibited awards of presumed and punitive
damages for false and defamatory statements unless the plaintiff
shows "actual malice," that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The question presented in this case is whether this
defamatory statements do
rule of Gertz applies when the false and
7
not involve matters of public concern.4
It should be noted immediately that it was on this issue alone that
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White agreed with Justice Powell
in voting for the affirmance of the Vermont Supreme Court opinion,
and not on the media-nonmedia issue.
Justice Powell went on to say: "Recognizing disagreement
among the lower courts about when the protections of Gertz apply
we granted certiorari."48 Then he stated his objections to the Dun &
Bradstreet analysis in the courts below:
As an initial matter, respondent contends that we need not determine
whether Gertz applies in this case because the instructions, taken as a
whole, required the jury to find "actual malice" before awarding presumed or punitive damages. The trial court instructed the jury that
because the report was libelous per se, respondent was not required
"to prove actual damages . .. since damages and loss [are] conclusively presumed." It also instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages only if it found "actual malice." Its only other relevant
instruction was that liability could not be established unless respondent showed "malice or lack of good faith on the part of the Defendant." Respondent contends that these references to "malice," "lack of
good faith," and "actual malice" required the jury to find knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth-the "actual malice" of
New York Times-before it awarded presumed or punitive damages.
We reject this claim because the trial court failed to define any of
these terms adequately. It did not, for example, provide the jury with
any definition of the term "actual malice." In fact, the only relevant
term it defined was simple "malice." And its definitions of this term
included not only the New York Times formulation but also other
concepts such as "bad faith" and "reckless disregard of the [statement's] possible consequences." The instructions thus permitted the
jury to award presumed and punitive damages on a lesser showing
that "actual malice." Consequently, the trial court's conclusion that
the instructions did not satisfy Gertz was correct, and the Vermont
Supreme Court's determination that Gertz was inapplicable was necessary to its decision that the trial court erred in granting the motion
for a new trial. We therefore must consider whether Gertz applies to
the case before us.'9

47. Id. at 2941-942.
48. Id. at 2942.
49. Id. at 2942-43.
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While it would be enlightening to quote at length from Justice
Powell's opinion, I believe that it may be fairly summed up in the
following excerpts from it:
We have never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when
the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern. To
make this determination, we must employ the approach approved in
Gertz and balance the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment
interest in protecting this type of expression. This state interest is
identical to the one weighed in Gertz. There we found that it was
"strong and legitimate."...
The First Amendment interest, on the other hand, is less important than the one weighed in Gertz. We have long recognized that not
all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on
"matters of public concern" that is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection."
In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concerns is of less
First Amendment concern. As a number of state courts, including the
court below, have recognized, the role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more limited when the concerns that activated
New York Times and Gertz are absent ...
In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no
matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately
supports awards of presumed and punitive damages - even absent a
showing of "actual malice." 50
Chief Justice Burger's opinion was quite brief. He asserted that
he had dissented in Gertz because he believed that, insofar as the
ordinary private citizen was concerned, he objected to the abandonment of the traditional theme of the law up to that time. He preferred to allow this area of the law to continue to evolve, rather than
to embark on a new doctrinal basis. "Gertz, however, is now the law
of the land, and until it is overruled, it must, under the principle of
stare decisis, be applied by this Court."'5' "The single question
before the Court today is whether Gertz applies to this case. ' 2 He
agreed with the plurality opinion "that Gertz is limited to circumstances in which the alleged defamatory expression concerns a matter of general public importance, and that the expression in question
here relates to a matter of essentially private concern. 5 3s His belief
remains, as suggested by Justice White, that Gertz should be overruled. He believes, also, that New York Times should be reconsidered, so that, at the very least, a writing should be actionable if in
5
the exercise of reasonable care it should be revealed as untrue. 4
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 2944-46 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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As with his dissenting opinion in Gertz, Justice White deals
with the Greenmoss issues more fully. He noted:
I joined the judgment and opinion in New York Times. I also joined
later decisions extending the New York Times standard to other situations. But I came to have increasing doubts about the soundness of
the Court's approach and about some of the assumptions underlying
it. I could not join the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, and I dissented in Gertz, asserting that the common-law remedies should be
retained for private plaintiffs. I remain convinced that Gertz was erroneously decided. I have also become convinced that the Court struck
an improvident balance in the New York Times case between the
public's interest in being fully informed about public officials and
public affairs and the competing interest of those who have been defamed in vindicating their reputation. 65
Justice White went on more fully as to the vices of New York
Times. He stated:
The New York Times rule thus countenances two evils: first, the
stream of information about public officials and public affairs is polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and second, the
reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehoods that might have been avoided with a reasonable
effort to investigate the facts. In terms of the First Amendment and
reputational interests at stake, these seem grossly perverse results."
And more specifically with respect to the failings of Gertz Justice White wrote:
Although there was much talk in Gertz about liability without fault
and the unfairness of presuming damages . . . [and] protecting the
press from intimidating damages liability . . . it is evident that the

Court in [New York Times and Gertz] engaged in severe overkill in
both cases.
In New York Times, instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden of
proof to an almost impossible level, we could have achieved our stated
goal by limiting the recoverable damages to a level that would not
unduly threaten the press. Punitive damages might have been scrutinized as Justice Harlan suggested in Rosenbloom, or perhaps even entirely forbidden. Presumed damages to reputation might have been
prohibited, or limited, as in Gertz. Had that course been taken and
the common-law standard of liability been retained, the defamed public official, upon proving falsity, could at least have had a judgment to
that effect. His reputation would then be vindicated; and to the extent
possible, the misinformation circulated would have been countered.
He might have also recovered a modest amount, enough perhaps to
pay his litigation expenses. At the very least, the public official should
not have been required to satisfy the actual malice standard where he
sought damages but only to clear his name. In this way, both First
Amendment and reputational interests would have been far better
55.
56.

Id. at 2950.
Id. at 2951.
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Thus while Justice White joined in the affirmance of the Greenmoss
judgment, he had heavy reservations with respect to the direction in
which the law of defamation was going. It is clear that he would
have preferred that we live with the common-law, at least with respect to the rights of individuals.
The dissent that Justice Brennan wrote, which was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, is twice as long as the
plurality opinion of Justice Powell. He declared that Justice Powell
has, in effect, undermined Gertz by introducing what he regards as
the new element of matters of public or general interest.5" Gertz, he
says, does not make such distinction, and it is really not justified in
the plurality opinion.8 9 Having said this and much more in opposition to that opinion, he concludes by declaring that "Greenmoss
Builders should be permitted to recover for any actual damages it
can show resulted from Dun & Bradstreet's negligently false credit
report, but should be required to show actual malice to receive presumed or punitive damages." 60 Brennan might well have reminded
Powell that the latter had made a special point in Gertz of the impracticality of ad hoc decisions of what is important or unimportant
in substance as a reason for limiting Rosenbloom.
Justice Brennan makes one statement that is not necessarily
true, as I read the various opinions in the case. He says that at least
six members of the Court agree that "the rights of the institutional
media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities."" I do not
see that the Court has indicated that it expressly rejects the media
nonmedia distinction as a constitutional matter. It has simply not
decided the case on that basis, possibly because it was easier to do
so on another basis. It is not impossible that, in a more appropriate
context, it will embrace the distinction in at least a limited fashion.
It may yet be impressed by what the Supreme Court of Vermont
and a majority of jurisdictions say on the subject of the distinction
between media and nonmedia.
Some are troubled because the Greenmoss Court seems to have
created a new category of expression, thus further complicating an
already complex field of the law. Until Greenmoss the Court seemed
to have dropped the common-law rules of defamation, in which
there might be recovery without proof of either fault to injury. That
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

2951-52.
2959.
2965.
2959.
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seemed to be the meaning of Gertz. Now it seems to be saying that,
after all, the common-law will apply and not New York Times or
Gertz if the aggrieved party is a private person and the defamatory
expressions does not relate to a matter of public concern.
Some questions remain unanswered, but may be resolved in the
present term of the Court. Who determines if the material is of public concern - the trier of the facts or the court? We must also, ask
if the burden of proof as to all issues, except possibly the fact of
publication, remains in the defendant as at common-law. This would
mean that the defendant would have the burden in Greenmoss cases
of proving the truth of the expression, and more than the truth that the publication was made without malice and for laudable
purposes.
There remains the issue of the recovery of punitive damages.
Under both New York Times and Gertz, such damages may be recovered only if there is "actual malice" as defined in New York
Times, not malice as at common-law. It is not unlikely that a majority of the Court will so conclude one day. But it only means that if
the defamation is sufficiently heinous the jury will, somehow, find a
way to enlarge actual damages.
It may be unfair or unfounded to say so, but, in some moods, it
seems to me that there are three principal opponents of permitting
aggrieved parties to recover for defamation. There are those who
would abolish the action of libel completely or require proof of "actual malice" in all instances, public or private, or would limit recovery in every case to actual damages and exclude completely punitive
damages. There are individuals or entities, such as the media, with a
pecuniary stake in defending such actions, or rigid civil libertarians
with an inflexible belief in an absolute privilege for all expression
under the First Amendment, or Ivory Tower academic persons without any great experience in the real world. It seems to me that damages to the reputation can be as serious or more serious than bodily
harm, recompensed by recovery in personal injury cases. A blatant
enough lie or misstatement about a professional, business or lay person can destroy or reduce a practice or a business or one's standing
in the community or one's self esteem. The circumstance that the
media may be involved and that we are all concerned with the freedom of speech and the press should not be the sole consideration or
necessarily the most important. "Media" is a too general expression.
If it includes reputable organs like the New York Times and the
Christian Science Monitor, it also includes, perhaps more often
than not, the most irresponsible tabloids and scandal sheets. In a
civilized society we owe it to each other not to be careless or trifling
with reputations. At the very least, ordinary care ought to be expended to ascertain the truth.
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When New York Times and Gertz were decided, there was reasonable certainty, so far as most litigants and lawyers were concerned, as to the circumstances in which both cases applied and the
consequences thereof. It seems to me that there is not the same assurance with respect to Greenmoss. It may prove as evanescent as
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.6 2 Virtually all of the lower courts assumed after Rosenbloom that it reflected the true state of the law,
even if it was nominally only a plurality opinion. With Gertz that
misconception was corrected. Then came Greenmoss to complicate
the situation once more. One will have to await further rulings of the
highest court.
While six justices accepted the basic premise of Justice Powell
in Greenmoss, it would have been much better precedentially and
practically if the six had joined in one majority opinion, expressing,
if necessary, any doubts or reservations in addenda to the majority
opinion. But that is not the way of Supreme Court justices. Thus we
must accept the situation and be concerned only about the application of Greenmoss and how long a life there may be to it.
One returns again and again to the issue of damages in defamation actions. It is anomalous, to say the least, that we accept the
likelihood of huge recoveries in personal injury cases, but some people, particularly the media and their advocates, gag at the thought
of damages being determined by the selfsame kind of jury that will
assess damages in a defamation case. Is there really a difference?
Until 1964, when New York Times was decided, few would have
thought of establishing constitutional guidelines in defamation or
limiting the recovery in any way. The truth is that there is a kind of
mythology that has sprung up in this area, suddenly and unreasonably. It does not help us in the evolving process of the development
of the law. As Lincoln said in another context, "We must disenthrall
ourselves." We must do so if we are to arrive at just and workable
solutions. There is room for simplification, but not obfuscation.

62.

403 U.S. 29 (1971).

